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LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
CITIZENSHIP: RECONSIDERING AN
ILLOGICAL AND INCONSISTENT CHOICE
DEBRA R. COHEN ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is about the disconnect between the modern business
realities of the limited liability company (“LLC”) and the formalistic
rules for determining the citizenship of LLCs for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. This is neither an article about the value of diversity
jurisdiction in today’s society, nor whether it should be preserved,
1
limited, or abolished. Those articles have been written. This Article
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law. A.B., 1985,
Brown University; J.D., 1988, Emory University School of Law. With heartfelt thanks to
Richard D. Freer for his comments and encouragement. I also thank Southern New England
School of Law for providing research support.
1. See Richard Allan, Démarche or Destruction of the Federal Courts—A Response to
Judge Friendly’s Analysis of Federal Jurisdiction, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 637, 655–56 (1974)
(abolish diversity); George W. Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REV.
356, 378 (1933) (limit diversity); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the
Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79,
132–33 (1993); Howard C. Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction—An Idea Whose Time Has Passed,
51 IND. L.J. 347, 351–53 (1976) (limit diversity); Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 193 (1929) (support
diversity); Charles E. Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19
A.B.A. J. 499, 503 (1933) (limit diversity); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the
American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1968) (limit diversity); John P. Frank, The
Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 413–14 (1979) (support diversity);
John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 13 (1963) (support
diversity); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction—In Reply to Professor Yntema,
79 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1931) (abolish diversity); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 530 (1928)
(abolish diversity); Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local
Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 104 (1980) (support diversity);
Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A
Legislative Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 314 (1979) (abolish diversity); Larry
Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 121–29 (abolish diversity with
exceptions); Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal
Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 227–30 (1982) (support diversity); Carl McGowan, Federal
Jurisdiction: Legislative and Judicial Change, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 517, 533–34 (1978)
(limit diversity); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: The Silver Lining, 66
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accepts as a premise, good, bad, or indifferent, that diversity jurisdiction
2
is constitutionally permissible and congressionally authorized. This
Article also accepts as a premise that the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction is to provide a neutral forum when necessary to protect
3
litigants from actual or perceived local bias.
From the outset, diversity jurisdiction has been both congressionally
4
and judicially limited. In 1806, the Supreme Court mandated complete
5
diversity; no plaintiff could have the same citizenship as any defendant.

A.B.A. J. 177, 180 (1980) (abolish diversity); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity
Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963,
1011–12 (1979); Donald T. Weckstein, Citizenship for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction, 26
SW. L.J. 360, 382 (1972) (reform diversity); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 240 (1948) (limit diversity);
Charles Alan Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute
Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 207–08 (1969) (limit diversity); Hessel E. Yntema,
The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19
A.B.A. J. 71, 72 (1933) (reform diversity).
2. The Constitution provides for diversity jurisdiction in cases “between Citizens of
different States.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. From the outset, Congress has empowered the
federal courts to hear diversity cases. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79.
Despite numerous calls for abolition and numerous attempts at legislation, diversity
jurisdiction continues. See supra note 1.
3. Although the purpose of diversity jurisdiction was not expressly articulated by the
founding fathers, it is commonly accepted that the purpose was to provide a neutral forum.
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2617–18 (2005); CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (6th ed. 2002) (“The
traditional explanation of diversity jurisdiction is a fear that state courts would be prejudiced
against those litigants from out of state.”); Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of Nonsense:
Reforming Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 181, 190 (1998) (“[T]he principal argument
for diversity jurisdiction is the protection of out-of-state litigants from local prejudice.”).
4. Initially, Congress limited diversity jurisdiction to suits “where the matter in dispute
exceeds . . . five hundred dollars, and . . . is between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
Congress has always imposed an amount in controversy requirement. Initially, the amount in
controversy had to exceed $500. §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. at 78–79. Since then, the amount has been
increased five times. In 1887, it was raised to in excess of $2000. Act of March 3, 1887, ch.
373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552. In 1911, it was raised to in excess of $3000. Act of March 3, 1911,
ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091. In 1958, it was raised to in excess of $10,000. Act of July 25,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415. In 1988, it was raised to in excess of $50,000.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642,
4646 (1988). Most recently, in 1997, it was raised to in excess of $75,000. Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850. In Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806), the Supreme Court imposed the requirement of
complete diversity.
5. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267. Complete diversity is not required in all
circumstances. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (requiring
only “two adverse parties [who] are not co-citizens”). Congress has authorized minimal
diversity in several circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000) (two or more adverse
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The Court judicially imposed a screening mechanism that, using the
6
citizenship of the litigants, identifies cases for which diversity
7
jurisdiction is appropriate. In theory, if there are citizens from the
same state on both sides of the litigation, concerns about local bias are
8
diminished, and there is no need for a neutral forum.
The LLC is a state-created organization that combines the
partnership characteristic of flow-through tax treatment with the
9
corporate characteristic of owner limited liability.
As a hybrid
organization, there are two possibilities for determining the citizenship
of an LLC—the “persons composing” rule, which is applied to
10
partnerships, or § 1332(c)(1), which is applied to corporations. The
persons composing rule, also known as “aggregate citizenship,” is a
common law rule that looks through a business organization to all of its
owners. Under the persons composing rule, an LLC could be a citizen
11
of as many states as it has members. Section 1332(c)(1), also known as
“entity citizenship,” deems a corporation to have the citizenship of its
12
state of incorporation and its principal place of business. Under entity

claimants); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9–10
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)).
6. As a general rule, the focus is on the real parties to the controversy—those litigants
that have control of, a stake in, or liability for the litigation. It does not focus on nominal or
formal parties. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.15
(3d ed. 2006); see infra text accompanying notes 201–203.
7. The citizenship of a natural person has consistently been held to be the individual’s
domicile. “[T]o be a citizen of a state within the meaning of the diversity provision, a natural
person must be both (1) a citizen of the United States, and (2) a domiciliary of that state.”
Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996); see Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir.
1974). A person has only one domicile at a time. She is born with the domicile of her parents
and changes it only when she is physically present in another state with the intent to remain
there indefinitely. See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624–25 (1914); Mas, 489 F.2d at
1399. There are two choices for the citizenship of a business organization. See infra text
accompanying notes 10–13.
8. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, § 102.12[1]. But see Lilly, supra note 3, at 191
(suggesting neutralization argument is weak).
9. This was not the first attempt to combine owner limited liability with flow-through tax
treatment. Previously created hybrid organizations include the Subchapter S corporation and
the limited partnership. Each had issues. See Debra R. Cohen, Citizenship of Limited
Liability Companies for Diversity Jurisdiction, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 435, 443–45
(2002). The LLC and the limited liability partnership appear to be more successful than
previously created hybrid organizations, in part because the adoption of check-the-box
eliminated taxation as a concern in the formation decision. See infra note 134.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2005).
11. This scenario assumes that each member of the LLC is a citizen of a different state.
12. Section 1332(c) was added to the diversity statute in 1958. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415. Congress codified the Court created rule of entity citizenship.
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citizenship, an LLC could be, at most, a citizen of two states—its state of
13
creation and its principal place of business.
14
Although the LLC is not yet thirty, courts and commentators are
asserting that, for diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of an LLC is
15
“emphatically settled.”
The persons composing rule applies. This
16
Since the mid-nineteenth
conclusion is consistent with precedent.
century, entity citizenship has been universally accepted for
17
corporations. However, with one exception, the Supreme Court has
18
repeatedly refused to extend entity citizenship to hybrid organizations.
Over time, this refusal has come to be known as maintaining the
19
“doctrinal wall.”

This included not only the state of incorporation but also the state of the principal place of
business. The principal place of business was included to prevent local corporations from
invoking diversity jurisdiction. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
13. While technically a corporation may be incorporated in more than one state, this is
rare. MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, § 102.53. Principal place of business is not statutorily
defined, but it has been judicially limited to a single state. Unger v. Del E. Webb Corp., 233
F. Supp. 713, 714 (N.D. Cal. 1964). Federal courts of appeal have applied different tests to
determine a corporation’s principal place of business. These include the “nerve center” test,
the “muscle center” test, and the “total activity” test. See Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood
Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (“nerve center”); Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284
F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960) (“muscle center” or “place of activity”); J.A. Olson Co. v. City of
Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 404, 411–12 (5th Cir. 1987) (“total activity”).
14. The LLC was first recognized in Wyoming in 1977. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 446–
48 (providing a brief history of the development of the LLC); Wyoming Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101
to -147) (1977). Within twenty years every state had an LLC statute. LLCs are growing in
popularity. See infra note 36.
15. Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Diversity Jurisdiction for LLCs?, 14 BUS.
L. TODAY 31, 31 (2004) (noting that the question of whether an LLC is more like a
corporation or a partnership for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is “emphatically settled”).
See also Pramco, LLC v. San Juan Bay Marina, Inc., 435 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (“We see
no reason to depart from this well-established rule.”); Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign
Mkt. Place, LLC, 350 F.3d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Counsel and the magistrate judge
assumed that a limited liability company is treated like a corporation . . . . That is not right.
Unincorporated enterprises are analogized to partnerships . . . .”).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 46–59.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 93–103.
18. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990). The one exception, Puerto
Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), has been limited to its facts. See infra text
accompanying notes 64–69 and 136–38.
19. The phrase “doctrinal wall” was first coined in United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965). It was subsequently reiterated by
the Supreme Court in Carden, 494 U.S. at 189–90. It has also been used by numerous
commentators. See, e.g., Ryan A. Christy, Redefining the Juridical Person: Examining the
Business Trust and Other Unincorporated Associations for Citizenship Purposes, 6 DUQ. BUS.
L.J. 137, 139 (2004); Cohen, supra note 9, at 462; Matthew C. Dodge, Comment, Determining
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Despite a bandwagon of support, declaring the extension of the
doctrinal wall to LLCs “emphatically settled” is premature. Aggregate
20
citizenship for LLCs is not as firmly entrenched as rhetoric indicates.
More important, it is motivated by “concern about the burdens of
21
diversity jurisdiction—not sound doctrinal analysis.”
Refusing to grant LLCs entity citizenship is a continuation of ends22
oriented decisions clothed in language of precedent and deference.T
The motivation for these decisions stems from judicial concerns
regarding an overcrowded federal docket, not substantial changes in the
laws governing business organizations or the purpose of diversity
23
jurisdiction. The assumption underlying this ends-oriented approach is
that aggregate, instead of entity, citizenship decreases the probability
that an LLC can satisfy complete diversity and thereby reduces the
24
number of actions eligible for diversity jurisdiction.

the Citizenship of LLC Members for Diversity Purposes: Seemingly Simple, Difficult Enough
to Compel an Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), 80 TUL. L. REV. 661, 664 (2005); John
McCormack, Comment, Carden v. Arkoma Associates: The Citizenship of Limited
Partnerships, Associations, and Juridical Entities—A Chilling Future for Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 505, 522 (1992); Scott M. Rickard, Comment, Shoring Up
the “Doctrinal Wall” of Chapman v. Barney: In Support of the Aggregate Approach to Limited
Liability Company Citizenship for Purposes of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 40
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 739, 740 (2004); Charles A. Szypszak, Jural Entities, Real Parties in
Controversy, and Representative Litigants: A Unified Approach to the Diversity Jurisdiction
Requirements for Business Organizations, 44 ME. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992); Robert J. Tribeck,
Cracking the Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Barney: A New Diversity Test for Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 89, 107 (1995).
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. Szypszak, supra note 19, at 2. See infra Part III.C.
22. See infra Part III.C.
23. Concern about the federal docket is not new. Expressions of concern date back at
least to the expansion of diversity jurisdiction in 1875. Concerned with the deluge of diversity
actions, both Congress and the Supreme Court sought to restrict diversity jurisdiction. See
James William Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and
Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8 (1964). See Carden, 494 U.S. at 207 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“The concern perhaps implicit in the Court’s holding today is that failure to consider the
citizenship of all the members of an unincorporated business association will expand diversity
jurisdiction at a time when our federal courts are already seriously overburdened.”). With the
addition of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9–10
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)), there is reason to believe that the problem will only
worsen.
24. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 207 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[F]ailure to consider the
citizenship of all the members of an unincorporated business association will expand diversity
jurisdiction at a time when our federal courts are already seriously overburdened.”); Cohen,
supra note 9, at 438 (“The Court perceives that deeming unincorporated organizations to
have the citizenship of all their members, rather than entity citizenship, reduces the number
of actions eligible for diversity jurisdiction.”); Amy L. Levinson, Developments in Diversity
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First, the underlying assumption that treating LLCs like partnerships
25
will ease the overcrowded federal docket is not empirically supported.
Even if treating LLCs like partnerships does reduce the number of
actions eligible for diversity jurisdiction, any benefit gained from the
reduction is likely to be offset by the increased complexity in
26
determining whether complete diversity is satisfied.
Second, the rationale for treating LLCs like partnerships, precedent
27
and deference, lacks substance.
Precedent only applies to similar
circumstances, and LLCs are not similar to partnerships. Further,
despite assertions of deference to Congress, the Supreme Court has
been defining citizenship since it mandated complete diversity in 1806.
Third, even when faced with similar circumstances, precedent should
not be followed when it becomes difficult to apply or creates
inconsistencies with other laws. Even if LLCs are similar to limited
partnerships because they are both unincorporated organizations,
treating LLCs like partnerships produces illogical and inconsistent
28
results. Focusing on the citizenship of LLC members undercuts the
screening function performed by the complete diversity requirement.
The analysis no longer assures a federal forum when one is appropriate
nor precludes a federal forum when one is inappropriate. Treating
LLCs like partnerships also undermines well established federal policies
that determine citizenship according to federal law and prevent nominal
parties from barring federal jurisdiction.
When courts, ignoring modern business realities, treat an LLC like a
partnership, they undercut the concept of jurisdictional parity, that
similar parties should be afforded similar access to diversity
29
jurisdiction. Additionally, this approach permits an LLC to change its

Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1407, 1422 (2004) (“The more members, the more likely it
is that one of them will defeat the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge.”).
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. An analysis of an overcrowded federal docket that focuses only on the number of
diversity actions filed is incomplete. A complete analysis must also examine the duration of
diversity cases. See Marsh, supra note 1, at 220; see infra Part IV.B.3.
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. “It should be axiomatic that comparable entities should receive equal . . . access to
the federal courts.” Taylor Simpson-Wood, Has the Seductive Siren of Judicial Frugality
Ceased to Sing?: Dataflux and its Family Tree, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 281, 338 (2005). In 1882,
Congress revised the provision on jurisdiction for national banks to create parity with nonnational banks. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. 941, 947 (2006).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967435

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW, VOLUME 90, ISSUE 2, PAGE 269

2006]

LLC CITIZENSHIP

275

30

citizenship from day to day. As the existence of complete diversity is
determined based on the citizenship at the time of filing, an LLC can
manipulate its citizenship to manufacture or destroy diversity.
Fourth, as a practical matter, applying the persons composing rule to
LLCs creates logistical difficulties. While the persons composing rule is
simple in theory, in practice it is not, particularly because the
membership of an LLC is not public information. Courts seek to settle
the question of whether the court is an appropriate forum simply and
31
efficiently.
However, this approach results in the expenditure of
additional resources to determine the existence of diversity and those
expenditures likely exceed any benefits gained by reducing the number
32
of eligible cases.
This Article examines the decisions that, for purposes of determining
citizenship, treat LLCs like partnerships. After showing that, to borrow
from Mark Twain, assertions that the issue is “emphatically settled” are
greatly exaggerated, this Article examines the stated and unstated
reasons for adopting this approach and explores the illogical and
inconsistent results that follow. Just as the formalistic rules of personal
33
jurisdiction found in Pennoyer v. Neff gave way to the more flexible
34
standard in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, this Article
concludes that it is time to leave the mechanical rules of citizenship
behind. A better approach is needed, one that both reflects modern
business realities and promotes the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. It
suggests applying the aggregate/entity dichotomy in a functional rather
than mechanical manner. Finally, this Article suggests that there are
reasons to believe that, if faced with the question of citizenship of LLCs,

30. Members with one citizenship might sell to a person or organization with another
citizenship. Alternatively, a member might change his, her, or its citizenship. A change of
domicile by any member of an LLC changes the citizenship of the LLC. However, there is no
mechanism to assure that the LLC is aware of this change. As a result, under the persons
composing rule, an LLC, at any given time, might not know all the states in which it is a
citizen.
31. See Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[D]etermining
whether a case belongs in federal court should be done quickly, without an extensive factfinding inquiry.”); Coté v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Jurisdictional rules
should be as simple as possible, so that the time of litigants and judges is not wasted deciding
where a case should be brought . . . .”).
32. See infra Part IV.B.3.
33. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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the Supreme Court might be ready to break with the mechanical
35
tradition.
II. PERPETUATING THE DOCTRINAL WALL
A. Cosgrove and Carden
36

As the LLC gains popularity, LLCs are parties in a growing
number of suits in federal court, many of which are based on diversity
37
jurisdiction. As a result, federal courts must ascertain the citizenship
of LLCs with more frequency. In several early decisions, without
38
discussion, courts treated LLCs like corporations. In 1996, in Carlos v.
Adamany, a district court expressly indicated that LLCs would be
39
treated like corporations for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit rejected this approach in Cosgrove v.
40
Bartolotta. Cosgrove presented an ideal opportunity to address the
issue because complete diversity existed regardless of whether

35. See infra Part V.
36. According to the IRS, based on tax returns, the number of LLCs went from 221,498
in 1996 to 946,130 in 2002. See I.R.S., Statistics of Income (SOI) Tax Stats – Integrated
Business Data 1980–2002, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/80ot1all.xls. In many
states, LLC filings are outpacing corporate filings for newly created businesses. INT’L ASS’N
OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JURISDICTIONS (2006), available at
http://www.iaca.org/downloads/AnnualReports/2006_IACA_AR.pdf; see also Howard M.
Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The Social Cost of Academic Neglect, 38 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 35, 36–39 (2004).
37. A search of the federal district courts database (DCT) on Westlaw indicates that the
number of cases in which an LLC was a party went from 14 in 1995 to 2171 in 2005. Westlaw,
http://www.westlaw.com (search database DCT, search terms ti(“limited liability company”
LLC L.L.C.) & da(1995 or 2005)).
38. See SMS Financial II, LLC v. Stewart, No. 3:95-CV-1280-D, 1996 WL 722080, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 1996) (requiring an LLC to specify its state of incorporation and principal
place of business to establish that diversity jurisdiction is satisfied); Dali (USA), Inc. v. Lee,
No. 96 Civ. 3305 (MBM), 1996 WL 592723, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1996) (repeating
pleadings, which aver that Bogari International, LLC “is a New York corporation with its
principal place of business in New York”); Cosmetech Int’l, LLC v. Der Kwei Enter. and Co.,
943 F. Supp. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (deeming LLC to be a New York corporation).
39. No. 95 C50264, 1996 WL 210019, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Ill. April 17, 1996). Judge Reinhard
noted that if the plaintiff’s new LLC replaced the defunct corporate plaintiff, citizenship for
purposes of diversity would still be determined under the nerve center test. Id. at *2. But see
Int’l Flavors and Textures, LLC v. Gardner, 966 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (issue
subsequently decided the other way).
40. 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998).
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citizenship was determined using the persons composing rule or §
41
1332(c).
The conclusion that an LLC’s citizenship should be determined
under the persons composing rule was foreshadowed when Judge
Posner recapped the rule for determining the citizenship of a
partnership but not the rule for determining the citizenship of a
42
corporation. The brief analysis, a single sentence with a single citation,
43
analogizes the LLC to the limited partnership. Once likened to the
limited partnership, Carden v. Arkoma Associates is deemed
44
precedential, and “unless Congress provides otherwise . . . the
citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction is the
45
citizenship of its members.”
In Carden, a divided Court “reiterated that ‘the doctrinal wall . . .’
46
The Court acknowledged the wellwould not be breached.”
47
established rule of entity citizenship for corporations and that limited
partnerships are functionally similar to corporations and arguably
48
should be treated like corporations. However, citing precedent and

41. “Mary-Bart, LLC has only one member—Mr. Bartolotta, who is not a citizen of the
same state as the plaintiff.” Id. While the facts do not indicate the citizenship of Mr.
Bartolotta, it appears he is a citizen of Wisconsin. Mary-Bart, LLC was registered as an LLC
in Wisconsin on February 24, 1995 and has its principal office in Wisconsin. See Wis. Dep’t of
Fin. Insts, Corporate Registration Information System, Corporate Records of Mary-Bart,
LLC, http://www.wdfi.org/apps/cris/?action= (search “mary-bart”). Under both the persons
composing rule and § 1332(c), Mary-Bart would be a citizen of Wisconsin. The Seventh
Circuit could reject the district court’s approach without concern that the decision would be
appealed.
42. Cosgrove, 150 F.3d at 731 (“In the case of a regular corporation, the owners’ state of
citizenship is irrelevant to whether there is the required complete diversity; but in the case of
a partnership, it is crucial. The citizenship of a partnership is the citizenship of the partners,
even if they are limited partners, so that if even one of the partners (general or limited) is a
citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, the suit cannot be maintained as a diversity suit.”).
43. Id.
44. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
45. Cosgrove, 150 F.3d at 731.
46. 494 U.S. at 189 (internal citation omitted).
47. Id. at 188. In discussing the history of corporate citizenship, the Court acknowledged
that it had “not always reach[ed] the same conclusion.” Id. Initially, in Bank of U.S. v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91 (1809), the Court deemed the citizenship of a corporation
to be that of the persons composing it—the shareholders. However, thirty-five years later, in
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 498–503 (1844), the
Court overruled its earlier decision and held that a corporation had entity citizenship. A
decade later, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854), the
Court reaffirmed this result on different grounds. See also infra notes 93–97 and
accompanying text.
48. Carden, 494 U.S. at 196.
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deference to Congress, the Court refused to extend entity citizenship to
49
limited partnerships.
The precedent was established in 1889 when the Supreme Court first
addressed the citizenship of a hybrid organization in Chapman v.
50
Barney. In a brief opinion, the Court remanded for a determination of
51
the citizenship of the members of the joint stock company. Without
examining whether a joint stock company was similar to a corporation
or if there were reasons to apply entity citizenship, the Court concluded
that the joint stock company was “not a corporation, but . . . a mere
52
partnership.” The Court asserted that organization under the laws of a
state does not make the company a corporation. Further, being
authorized by that state to bring suit in the name of its president did not
53
confer entity citizenship for diversity jurisdiction.
The precedent was reiterated in Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co.
54
v. Jones.
The Court acknowledged that entity citizenship for
corporations “has been so long recognized and applied that it is not now
55
The Court also acknowledged that the limited
to be questioned.”
56
partnership association had many corporate attributes. Still, without

49. Id. at 195–96. “While the rule regarding the treatment of corporations as ‘citizens’
has become firmly established, we have . . . just as firmly resisted extending that treatment to
other entities.” Id. at 189. The Court also refused to look at the citizenship of less than all
the partners, limited and general, of the limited partnership. Id. at 193–95.
50. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
51. “The record does not show the citizenship of Barney or of any of the members of the
company.” Id. at 682.
52. Id. (emphasis removed) (“The allegation that the company was organized under the
laws of New York is not an allegation that it is a corporation. In fact, the allegation is, that
the company is not a corporation, but a joint-stock company—that is, a mere partnership.
And, although it may be authorized by the laws of the State of New York to bring suit in the
name of its president, that fact cannot give the company power, by that name, to sue in
Federal court. The company may have been organized under the laws of the State of New
York, and may be doing business in that State, and yet all the members of it may not be
citizens of that State.”).
53. Id. (“[A]lthough [the joint stock company] may be authorized by the laws of the
State of New York to bring suit in the name of its president, that fact cannot give the
company power, by that name, to sue in a federal court.”).
54. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
55. Id. at 456.
56. “[T]he capacity to sue and be sued by the name of the association does not make [a
limited partnership association] a corporation . . . .” Id. at 455–56. Under Pennsylvania law,
the limited partnership association was described as “a ‘quasi corporation,’ having some of
the characteristics of a corporation, or as a ‘new artificial person.’” Id. at 457 (emphasis
removed).
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explanation, the Court refused to extend entity citizenship to the limited
57
partnership association.
The Court reaffirmed this precedent in United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. when an unincorporated
58
labor union was held to have the citizenship of all of its members. The
Court recognized merit in the argument that the distinctions between
corporations and unincorporated organizations had blurred; however,
citing precedent and, for the first time deference, the Court indicated
that the decision to grant entity citizenship to unincorporated entities
59
was “properly a matter for legislative consideration.”
Like the Bouligny Court, the Carden Court expressed its deference
60
to Congress. The Court stated that, having created entity citizenship in
61
Letson, it had left adjustments to Congress. Highlighting § 1332(c), the
Court asserted that Congress had assumed control and “ha[d] not been
62
idle.” Then, adopting a literal reading of § 1332(c), the Court inferred
that by referencing only corporations, Congress intentionally excluded
63
hybrid organizations.
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. is the one exception to the Court’s
64
refusal to extend entity citizenship to hybrid organizations. In Russell,
the hybrid organization was a sociedad en comandita, organized under
65
the laws of Puerto Rico. The Court, adopting a functional analysis,
held that the sociedad en comandita was such a “complete” juridical
person that, like a corporation, it was deemed to have entity
66
citizenship. Russell was subsequently limited to its facts in Bouligny,
57. Id. (having some corporate characteristics is not a basis for extending entity
citizenship to a limited partnership association).
58. 382 U.S. 145, 153 (1965).
59. Id. at 147, 149–51, 153. Bouligny was the first time the Court addressed the question
of entity citizenship after the adoption of § 1332(c).
60. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196–97 (1990); Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 147,
153.
61. Carden, 494 U.S. at 196 (“[H]aving entered the field of diversity policy with regard to
artificial entities once (and forcefully) in Letson, we have left further adjustments to be made
by Congress.”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 196–97. The Court indicated that Congress knew about limited partnerships,
had it wanted to extend entity citizenship to limited partnerships, it would have expressly
included limited partnerships in § 1332(c).
64. Id. at 189 (stating that “[t]he one exception to the admirable consistency of our
jurisprudence on this matter is Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,” 288 U.S. 476 (1933)).
65. Russell, 288 U.S. at 480–81.
66. Id. at 481–82. The sociedad’s juridical “personality is so complete in contemplation
of the law of Puerto Rico that we see no adequate reason for holding that the sociedad has a
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when the Court indicated that the sociedad en comandita was “an exotic
67
creation of the civil law.” While acknowledging that the decision was
“technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to the considerations
raised by the changing realities of business organizations,” the Carden
Court accepted this limitation and concluded that only corporations
would be treated as entities; all other organizations would be assimilated
68
to partnerships.
The doctrinal wall is ends-oriented. It does not provide guidelines as
to when a hybrid organization might be deemed to have entity
citizenship. It perpetuates a formalistic rule that arbitrarily divides
business organizations into two categories—corporations and everything
69
else. Cosgrove followed suit.
B. Follow the Leader
Since Cosgrove, every circuit that has expressly decided the issue has
concurred. For purposes of determining citizenship for diversity, LLCs
are treated like partnerships. The analysis supporting these decisions,
like the analysis in Cosgrove, is almost non-existent. In large measure it
appears that the circuits are playing follow the leader.
The Second Circuit was the first to follow. In Handelsman v.
Bedford Village Associates Ltd. Partnership, the Second Circuit
70
concurred with Cosgrove with only a citation. The Eighth Circuit was
next, and it provided the most in-depth analysis. In GMAC Commercial
Credit LLC v. Dillard Department Stores, the court examined the
dichotomy between incorporated and unincorporated entities and the
Supreme Court’s resistance to extending entity citizenship to
71
unincorporated entities.
Citing Carden and Cosgrove, the Eighth
Circuit “dutifully adhere[d] to the same principle” in spite of the fact
72
that “numerous similarities exist between a corporation and an LLC.”
Raising the issue sua sponte and citing Cosgrove, Handelsman, and
GMAC, the Eleventh Circuit was the next to “join them in this
different status for purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under that
law.” Id. at 482. As a result of this conclusion, complete diversity was not satisfied and the
case was remanded to the Insular Court of Puerto Rico. Id. at 482, 484–85.
67. United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO v. Bouligny, 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965).
The Court also noted that the results in Russell destroyed diversity. Id. at 152.
68. Carden, 494 U.S. at196.
69. Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998).
70. 213 F.3d 48, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2000).
71. 357 F.3d 827, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 829.
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73

holding.”
The Fourth Circuit followed shortly thereafter, citing
GMAC as “one of many cases in which the court concludes a[n LLC] is
74
assigned the citizenship of its members.” More recently, in Pramco,
LLC v. San Juan Bay Marina, Inc., the First Circuit jumped on the
bandwagon, stating that “every circuit to consider this issue has held
that the citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the
citizenship of all of its members. We see no reason to depart from this
75
well-established rule.”
Additionally, in Johnson v. Columbia
Properties Anchorage, LP, the Ninth Circuit, noting the uniformity
among circuits, joined her “sister circuits” holding that “like a
partnership, an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its
76
District courts that have expressly
owners/members are citizens.”
addressed the question have also shown a tendency to follow the
77
leader.
III. EXAGGERATIONS
A. Not Emphatically Settled
While a majority of circuits have followed Cosgrove, the issue is not
“emphatically settled.” Many judges seem to find the alternative
approach more intuitive. Both the Sixth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit,
without discussion, have applied § 1332(c) to determine the citizenship
78
of an LLC. In Kalamazoo Acquisitions, LLC v. Westfield Insurance

73. Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1022
(11th Cir. 2004) (“[F]ederal appellate courts that have answered this question have all
answered it in the same way: like a limited partnership, a limited liability company is a citizen
of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen.”). The court also cited Homfeld
II, LLC v. Comair Holdings, 53 F. App’x 731 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion) and
Provident Energy Assocs. of Montana v. Bullington, 77 F. App’x 427, 428 (9th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished opinion). Rolling Greens, 374 F.3d at 1022. As Homfeld and Provident Energy
are both unpublished opinions, they have limited if any precedential value.
74. Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 2004).
75. 435 F.3d 51, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
76. 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). This was a case of first impression as the earlier
Ninth Circuit opinion addressing this issue was unpublished. See Provident Energy, 77 F.
App’x at 428–29 (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990)) ( “[T]he
citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of each of its members.”).
77. Note, however, that many courts have assumed a contrary answer without expressly
addressing it. See infra Part III.A.
78. See Maroy v. ISIS, LLC of Okla., No. CIV-06-0776-F, 2006 WL 2056661, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. July 21, 2006) (“The Tenth Circuit has not specifically ruled with respect to the method
of determining the citizenship of a limited liability company for purposes of diversity
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Co., in explaining the invocation of diversity, the Sixth Circuit indicated
that “Kalamazoo is a Michigan [LLC], with its principal place of
79
business in Michigan.” In Shell Rocky Mountain Production, LLC v.
Ultra Resources, Inc., the Tenth Circuit stated that “[i]t is undisputed
that Shell is a Delaware . . . (LLC) and its principal place of business is
80
Houston, Texas. Thus, Shell is a citizen of both Delaware and Texas.”
In addition, several district courts have also applied § 1332(c) without
81
discussion to determine the citizenship of LLCs.
Even in jurisdictions that have adopted the persons composing rule
for LLCs, judges are still deciding cases under § 1332(c). Since a 2004
82
decision asserting aggregate citizenship for LLCs, the Eleventh Circuit
has twice applied § 1332(c) to determine the citizenship of an LLC. In
MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, the defendant LLC is referred to
83
More recently, in Henderson v.
and treated as a corporation.
Washington National Insurance Co., an LLC is treated like a corporation
84
for purposes of determining citizenship.
This is also the case in the Fourth Circuit. Despite the adoption of
85
the persons composing rule, removal to federal court was not
questioned even though it was based on an assertion of citizenship that
jurisdiction.”); Kalamazoo Acquisitions, LLC v. Westfield Ins. Co., 395 F.3d 338, 341 n.5 (6th
Cir. 2005).
79. 395 F.3d at 341. The Sixth Circuit also applied § 1332(c) to determine citizenship of
an LLC in the unpublished opinion of Ferrer v. MedaSTAT USA, LLC, 145 F. App’x 116,
118–19 (6th Cir. 2005). These decisions contradict the earlier unpublished opinion in
Homfeld II, LLC v. Comair Holdings, Inc., 53 F. App’x 731, 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing
Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998) and Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446
U.S. 458, 464 (1980) (LLC “is not treated as a corporation and has the citizenship of its
members”)).
80. 415 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005).
81. A few examples include Cole v. Mattina Insurance Agency, No. 1:06CV394 LTSJMR, 2006 WL 1364263, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 16, 2006) (deeming AmFed Companies, LLC a
Mississippi corporation and concluding diversity existed); PeopleSoft, Inc. v. Amherst, LLC,
369 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266 (D. Colo. 2005) (accepting allegations of LLC’s citizenship based
on state of creation and principal place of business); and Tai v. Martin, No. 95-2319-JWL,
1996 WL 227783, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 1996) (assuming, without deciding, that a Kansas
limited liability company’s citizenship was dependent on its principal place of business).
82. Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1022
(11th Cir. 2004).
83. 420 F.3d 1234, 1237 (2005) (discussing the principal place of business of Hobbs
Group, LLC).
84. 454 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006). In that case, the plaintiff, an Alabama resident,
sued Washington National Insurance Company and Conseco Services, LLC. The court found
that Conseco was incorporated in Indiana, where it also has its principal place of business.
See id.
85. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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stated, “[the company] is a limited liability company organized under
the laws of the State of Maryland with its principal place of business in
86
Owings Mills, Maryland.”
87
Lawyers also seem to intuitively treat LLCs like corporations.
Many pleadings asserting diversity jurisdiction as a basis for subject
88
matter jurisdiction allege LLC citizenship under § 1332(c).
The
Seventh Circuit, which has emphatically stated several times that the
89
citizenship of an LLC is determined under the persons composing rule,
has remanded a number of cases while lawyers and judges continue to
90
apply § 1332(c) to determine the citizenship of LLCs.
Additionally, the issue remains undecided in several circuits.
Neither the Third Circuit nor the D.C. Circuit has addressed the issue.
The Fifth Circuit had an opportunity to follow Cosgrove, but instead
86. Strong Pharm. Lab., LLC v. Trademark Cosmetics, Inc., No. RDB 05-3427, 2006 WL
2033138, at *1 (D. Md. July 17, 2006).
87. Whether this is an intuitive conclusion, an expedient decision, or an exhibition of
ignorance is open to debate. One scholar suggests an expedient decision. See SimpsonWood, supra note 29, at 284–85.
88. An examination of recent complaints filed in federal court demonstrates this to be
true. See, e.g., Complant at 2, Trade-Winds Environmental Restoration, Inc. v. Steward, No.
06-7336 (E.D. La. Oct. 12, 2006), 2006 WL 3383183 (stating defendant LLC “a Delaware
corporation with a principal place of business” in Louisiana); Complaint at 1, Terranova v.
Lakeview Medical Center, LLC, No. 06-7323 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2006), 2006 WL 3382671
(stating LLC is “a foreign corporation incorporated in the state of Delaware”); Complaint at
2, Comeau v. Bray & Gillespie III Management LLC, No. 6:06CV891-OLR-18JGG (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 26, 2006) 2006 WL 3039088 (“Defendants are entities organized under the laws of
the state of Florida having their principal place of business in Florida.”); Third Party
Complaint at 2, Pier Fish Co., Inc. v. Empire Seafood, LLC, No. 1:06CA11712-RCL (D. Mass.
Sept. 29, 2006) 2006 WL 3266293 (stating LLC “is a Delaware corporation having a principal
place of business” in Florida); Complaint at 1, Everest Tradeshow Management LLC v.
Travel Goods Association, No. 06-4232 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2006) 2006 WL 3296578 (stating
LLC “registered/incorporated in the state of New York having its principal place of business”
in New York).
89. See, e.g., Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 2006); Belleville
Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt. Place, LLC, 350 F.3d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 2003); Tango Music,
LLC v. DeadQuick Music, Inc., 348 F.3d 244, 245 (7th Cir. 2003); Marseilles Hydro Power,
LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 299 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2002); Cosgrove v.
Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998).
90. See, e.g., Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that
the district court incorrectly assumed limited liability companies have two citizenships similar
to corporations); Belleville Catering Co., 350 F.3d at 694; McDaniel v. Qwest Commc’ns
Corp., No. 05-C-1008, 2006 WL 1476110, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2006) (noting the parties’
failure to properly identify the citizenship of each member of limited liability companies);
Complaint at 2, HW Aviation LLC v. Royal Sons, LLC, No. 06CV4445, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1,
2006) 2006 WL 2770360 (arguing there is complete diversity based on § 1332(c)); Complaint
at 2, Kaizen 3, LLC v. G.K. N. America, Inc., No. 06CV4407 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2006) 2006
WL 2770344 (arguing diversity jurisdiction exists under § 1332(c)).
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expressly indicated it was not deciding the issue.
And last, but
certainly not least, the Supreme Court has not yet voiced an opinion on
how to determine the citizenship of an LLC for purposes of diversity
92
jurisdiction.
The history of corporate citizenship is another reason to believe the
issue is not emphatically settled. The Supreme Court first determined
93
the citizenship of a corporation in 1809.
At that time, the Court
94
deemed corporations to have aggregate citizenship. As applied, this
approach undercut the purpose of diversity jurisdiction as it forced
litigants to sue corporations in their state of creation, depriving them of
95
Thirty-five years later, in Louisville, Cincinnati &
a neutral forum.
96
Charleston R.R. v. Letson, the Court overruled its decision.

91. Deciding the case on other grounds, the Fifth Circuit expressed “no opinion about
whether or not the district court’s holding regarding the citizenship of limited liability
companies is the proper interpretation of the law.” Unity Commc’ns, Inc. v. Unity Commc’ns
of Colo. LLC, 105 F. App’x 546, 547 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004).
92. Pramco, LLC v. San Juan Bay Marina, Inc., 435 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Neither
the Supreme Court nor this circuit has yet directly addressed whether that rule also applies to
limited liability companies.”).
93. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809). This was a few years after
the Court mandated complete diversity. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
94. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86 (“That invisible, intangible, and artificial being,
that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen . . . .”). Prior to this
there had been seven cases decided by the U. S. Supreme Court based on diversity
jurisdiction, and the issue of citizenship was not raised in any of them. Charles Warren,
Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 VA. L. REV. 661, 663 (1933).
95. Corporations forced litigants into state court by claiming that a shareholder was a
citizen of the state of the opposing party. David W. Jackson, Note, Federal Court Diversity
Jurisdiction and the Corporation, 8 TULSA L.J. 120, 121–22 (1972). At the time of Deveaux,
corporations were generally the defendants in actions. Warren, supra note 94, at 667. Due to
the limits of territorial jurisdiction, corporations could only be sued in their state of creation.
Id. Many corporations preferred state court, believing that it gave them a home field
advantage. See Jackson, supra, at 121; see also Rundle v. Del. & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 80, 95 (1852) (Catron, J., dissenting) (“If the United States courts could be ousted
of jurisdiction, and citizens of other States . . . be forced into the State courts, without the
power of election, they would often be deprived, in great cases, of all benefit contemplated by
the Constitution; and, in many cases, be compelled to submit their rights to judges and juries
who are inhabitants of the cities where the suit must be tried, and to contend with powerful
corporations . . . where the chances of impartial justice would be greatly against them; and
where no prudent man would engage with such an antagonist, if he could help it. State laws,
by combining large masses of men under a corporate name, cannot repeal the
Constitution . . . .”).
96. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 503 (1844). The Court indicated that Deveaux went too far
and should not be followed. Id. at 555–56.
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Recognizing the corporation as a legal entity distinct from its owner, the
97
Court established entity citizenship.
Since then, corporations have always had entity citizenship, but
corporate citizenship has not been static. A decade later, the Court
revised its rationale and established a conclusive presumption for
98
corporate citizenship. Over a century later, Congress amended § 1332
to add subsection (c), which deems a corporation to be a citizen of its
state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of
99
100
business. This amendment codified Letson.
At the time of Letson, corporations were generally formed in the
state where they conducted business, so citizenship in the state of
creation was synonymous with where they did business. However, over
time this changed. Many corporations ceased to incorporate in the state
101
in which they have their principal place of business.
The purpose of this amendment was to prevent local corporations
from invoking diversity jurisdiction when they have significant local
102
ties. It is possible that corporate citizenship could be amended again.
For example, it could be expanded to include more than one principal
103
place of business.

97. Id. at 558 (stating that a corporation is “a citizen of the state which created it, and
where its business is done, for all the purposes of suing and being sued”).
98. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328–29 (1853).
99. Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)).
100. See Tribeck, supra note 19, at 97 n. 31; supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
101. A corporation created under the laws of one state could conduct business in
another state. See William E. Kirk, III, A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism: How
Delaware Used the Federal-State System to Attain Corporate Pre-eminence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233,
243–44 (1984).
102. S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958) (“[F]iction of stamping a corporation a citizen of
the State of its incorporation has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution . . . is
enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal courts simply because it has obtained a
corporate charter from another State.”). A prime example of this abuse was Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523–24
(1928). In that case, a Kentucky corporation doing business in Kentucky manufactured
diversity jurisdiction by reincorporating in Tennessee. As citizenship was based solely on the
state of incorporation, diversity jurisdiction existed when the corporation sued a Kentucky
corporation. Id.
103. James W. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1426, 1432
(1964) (noting one principal place of business may not be sufficient for a corporation doing
significant business in a state that is not its state of incorporation or its principal place of
business). For other suggestions, see Marsh, supra, note 1 at 227–30.
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At just thirty, the LLC is gaining significant popularity.
As the
question of its citizenship arises with increasing frequency, the problems
created by an aggregate approach become more evident. The answer
may evolve, as it did for corporations.
B. Not Empirically Certain
Courts have rigidly adhered to the doctrinal wall in an effort to
105
reduce the number of cases eligible for diversity jurisdiction.
The
assumption is that an LLC is likely to be a citizen of more states under
aggregate citizenship than under entity citizenship, thereby reducing the
likelihood that an LLC can satisfy diversity. There is, however, no
empirical evidence that confirms application of the aggregate approach
106
achieves this result.
If LLCs were generally owned by a large number of members,
application of aggregate citizenship would statistically increase the
likelihood of citizenship in more states, which would statistically
107
But there is
decrease the likelihood of satisfying complete diversity.
no evidence to confirm that LLCs are generally owned by a large
108
number of members. In fact, there is limited evidence to the contrary.
Even if this assumption was correct, and application of the persons
composing rule does reduce the number of actions eligible for diversity
jurisdiction, the approach is still problematic. Although simple on its
face, applying the persons composing rule to LLCs creates
109
complications.
Addressing these complications consumes judicial
resources. An assessment is necessary to determine if the savings, if

104. See supra note 36.
105. Justice O’Connor suggests that the “concern is more illusory than real.” Carden v.
Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 207 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
106. While application of this rule changes which suits are eligible for diversity
jurisdiction, there is no way to empirically test whether it actually reduces the number of
eligible cases, and if so, by what percentage. Cohen, supra note 9, at 470 & n.219.
107. Data regarding the number of members in LLCs is generally not collected by states.
By virtue of tax filings, the Internal Revenue Service has this information, but neither
compiles nor publishes it.
108. Anecdotal evidence suggests that LLCs tend to be closely held businesses. One
study indicates that of the more than 65,000 law firms in the United States, 4,570 are
organized as LLCs. Of the 4,570 organized as LLCs, only sixty-four have fifty or more
lawyers. Firm size was measured by the total number of lawyers including associates and
other non-equity participants.
See Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of
Professional Service Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 BUS. LAW. 1387, 1398, 1401 & n.76 (2003).
109. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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any, achieved from reducing the federal docket are being spent applying
110
the persons composing rule to LLCs.
C. Neither Precedential nor Deferential
Citing precedent to support a conclusion is standard judicial
111
practice.
However, precedent is only applicable to similar
112
Therefore, Carden is only precedential if LLCs are
circumstances.
similar to limited partnerships.
Courts have great latitude in
113
determining which cases are similar.
The comparison of the LLC to the limited partnership in Cosgrove is
not persuasive. The single sentence likening the LLC to the limited
partnership fails to enumerate any similarities between the two entities;
114
it details solely a distinction between the two entities.
Contrary to
Judge Posner’s conclusion, the distinction aligns the LLC more closely
to the corporation than the limited partnership.
The distinction highlighted is that an LLC has no equivalent to the
general partner of the limited partnership.
Unlike the limited
partnership, which must have at least one general partner with personal
115
liability, no member of an LLC is subject to personal liability. This is
a fundamental distinction that typifies why partnerships are deemed to

110. See Marsh, supra note 1, at 220.
111. “Courts routinely recite precedents as dictating or at least directing their
conclusions.” Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1157 (2005).
112. Precedent requires similar cases be treated similarly. Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595–97 (1987).
113. See id.
114. “This animal is like a limited partnership; the principal difference is that it need
have no equivalent to a general partner, that is, an owner who has unlimited personal liability
for the debts of the firm.” Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing
generally for the proposition LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND
KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1998)). The referenced treatise also notes
other differences between LLCs and limited partnerships, including the fact that LLCs may
be formed with only one member, but limited partnerships require at least two. 1 LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES § 4:18 (2006).
115. Additionally, unlike a limited partner that can waive her limited liability by
exercising control of the business, an LLC member can manage the LLC without jeopardizing
her limited liability protection. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 303(b) (1996)
(members have no liability) with REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (2001) (limited
partners have no liability unless they exercise control).
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have aggregate citizenship while corporations are deemed to have entity
116
citizenship.
A partnership is a common law association of two or more people
117
created by contract. It is a private contract between people, not with
any state. While the partnership is sometimes reified for convenience, it
118
It is each
is still an amalgamation of people, not a separate entity.
partner, not the partnership, who is personally liable for the debts of the
119
partnership.
When sued, it is the partners, not the partnership, who
are the true litigants. Historically this was clear as an action by or
against a partnership was an action by or against the partners and had to
120
be brought in the name of all of the partners. Modern law, however,
obscures this important fact because, as a matter of convenience, state
121
laws permit litigation in the name of the partnership. This procedural
convenience, however, does not alter the fact that the partners are the

116. At the time these rules were established, corporations and partnerships had unique
characteristics. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 442.
117. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997).
118. See, e.g., Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (Ohio 1994) (“[A]
partnership is an aggregate of individuals and does not constitute a separate legal entity.”);
Reed v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 73 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Cal. 1937) (“[A] partnership is not
considered an entity, but an association of individuals.”); Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate
Dispute: Conceptualism and Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395 (1989)
(“A partner’s liability for partnership obligations is inconsistent with the concept of a
partnership as a separate legal entity.”). Also, any changes in partners dissolved the existing
partnership and created a new one. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 29 (1914).
119. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 15 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306 (1997).
120. See, e.g., Benson v. Pachetti, 349 So. 2d 17, 19–20 (Ala. 1977) (“[A]ll partners must
join as parties plaintiff in an action to enforce a claim in favor of a partnership . . . .”); White
v. Jackson, 166 S.E.2d 211, 214 (S.C. 1969) (noting that all partners must be joined in an
action); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984) (“One partner’s failure to join all
partners as plaintiffs is grounds for dismissal for lack of necessary parties.”).
121. For convenience, many states permit partnerships to be sued in the name of the
partnership. Watson v. G.C. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 691 P.2d 417, 419 (Nev. 1984). These
statutes are “enacted for the practical convenience and benefit of the partnership[s],
associations, and companies to which it relates, as well as for the convenience and benefit of
creditors, in bringing and prosecuting suits.” F.R. Patch Mfg. v. Capeless, 63 A. 938, 939 (Vt.
1906). A common name statute “provides a simpler means for a plaintiff to sue [the
association’s members] as a group” and “relieves a plaintiff from the task of having to name
and personally serve process on each and every member of the association.” Shortlidge v.
Gutoski, 484 A.2d 1083, 1087 (N.H. 1984). Many states have provided this convenience. E.g.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 369.5 (West 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 814 (2002).
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122

actual litigants. Therefore, it is the citizenship of each partner that is
123
relevant to an analysis of complete diversity.
A corporation, on the other hand, is a legal fiction created by the
124
state.
Corporate structure separates ownership from control and
provides owners, called shareholders, with protection against personal
125
Although artificially created, a corporation is treated like a
liability.
126
person for most purposes; it pays taxes and can sue and be sued.
In
litigation, the corporation, not the shareholders, is the true litigant.
Therefore, it is the corporation’s citizenship that is relevant to the
complete diversity analysis.
The dichotomy between entity citizenship for corporations and
aggregate citizenship for partnerships accurately reflected the functional
differences between these distinct organizations. When establishing
complete diversity, it highlighted the citizenship of the true litigants.
The creation of hybrid organizations complicated the analysis.
Evolving organizational laws caused the distinctions between business
127
organizations to blur. Hybrid organizations can now be structured to
128
Instead of fitting into discrete categories,
resemble one another.
organizations slot themselves in along the continuum, anchored on one
end by the “pure general partnership” and on the other end by the
129
“pure corporation.”

122. Shortlidge, 484 A.2d at 1087.
123. Despite the fact that there is no seminal case on the matter, it is universally
accepted that the citizenship of a partnership is that of each of its members. See MOORE ET
AL., supra note 6, § 102.57[1].
124. Corporations can only be formed by filing a certificate of incorporation with the
secretary of state. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.01 (1984).
125. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1984).
126. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 162 (1911). See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 3.02(1) (1984).
127. Cohen, supra note 9, at 442–45. This resulted from a confluence of changes. First,
mandatory statutes gave way to enabling statues. Second, the IRS replaced mechanical
compliance with the Kintner Regulations with check-the-box. While organizational statutes
still contain some mandatory provisions, modern organizational statutes are largely
contractarian or “enabling” statutes, which means the formation statute sets forth the default
rules that govern unless the owners agree otherwise. See id. at 441.
128. Robert R. Keatinge, Universal Business Organization Legislation: Will it Happen?
Why and When, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 29, 34 (1998) (increasing flexibility of organizational
statutes allows an organization to have the characteristics associated with another
organization).
129. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization
Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996).
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The treatise cited in Cosgrove deems the LLC to be similar to the
limited partnership; however, it also deems it to be similar to the
130
corporation.
Neither characterization is surprising because the LLC,
like the limited partnership, is a hybrid organization that combines
131
attributes of partnerships and corporations.
Analogizing LLCs to limited partnerships was arguably more
persuasive prior to 1997 when, to ensure flow-through taxation, LLCs
132
could have no more than two of four corporate characteristics.
Originally, many LLC organizational statutes were structured to ensure
133
compliance.
However, the adoption of check-the-box eliminated
134
LLCs were no longer required to have fewer than
these constraints.
three corporate characteristics to ensure flow-through. As a result, since
1997, LLCs are more analogous to corporations than limited
135
Accordingly, Carden, which addresses limited
partnerships.
partnerships, should not be deemed precedential for LLCs.

130. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 114, § 4:19. Judge Posner was not the first to
compare LLCs with limited partnerships. See Michael J. Garrison & Terry W. Knoepfle,
Limited Liability Company Interests as Securities: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 33
AM. BUS. L.J. 577, 586 (1996) (“LLCs are very similar to limited partnerships.”); Wayne M.
Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
387, 460 (1991) (“The LLC and the limited partnership with a corporate general partner are
almost equivalent for federal income tax purposes.”).
131. The LLC was another attempt to create an organization that provided limited
liability to owners and flow-through taxation. Prior attempts included the limited partnership
and the Subchapter S corporation. Cohen, supra note 9, at 443.
132. Check-the-box was adopted in 1996 and became effective in 1997. Treas. Reg. §§
301.7701-1 to -3 (1996). Prior to check-the-box, in order to be assured of flow-through
taxation treatment LLCs had to comply with the Kintner Regulations. “[T]he Treasury and
the Service . . . in effect, dictated the substance of business organization law.” Matheson &
Olson, supra note 129, at 3. The Regulations were not originally intended to be applied
mechanically, but they were. If an organization possessed more than two of four corporate
characteristics, it was deemed to more closely resemble a corporation and was subject to
entity taxation. These corporate characteristics were (1) continuity of life, (2) centralized
management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free transferability of interest. The Kintner
Regulations, Treas Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1995).
133. Several states, including Wyoming, Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, Michigan, and
Virginia, had “bullet proof” LLC statutes to ensure compliance. In these states, LLCs had
limited liability and centralized management, but they did not have continuity of existence or
free transferability. Cohen, supra note 9, at 447 & n.55.
134. Check-the-box permits unincorporated entities to elect entity or flow-through
taxation without regard for the number of corporate characteristics they posses. It eliminated
the need to structure an organization to preserve flow-through taxation. LLC statutes no
longer had to be “bullet proof.” See Cohen, supra note 9, at 447–48.
135. LLCs “should be viewed as generalizations of the business corporation.” Henry
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, The New Business Entities in Evolutionary
Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 6. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 465–66.
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136

Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., which the Court limited in Bouligny
and Carden, is the more appropriate precedent. The LLC appears
substantially similar to the sociedad en comandita, which no longer
appears to be an “exotic creation.” Like the sociedad en comandita, the
LLC can
contract, own property and transact business, sue and be
sued in its own name and right. . . . It is created by
articles of association . . . . Where the articles so provide,
[it] endures for a period prescribed by them regardless of
the death or withdrawal of individual members. . . .
Powers of management may be vested in managers. . . .
Its members are not primarily liable for the acts and
137
debts . . . .
Both are complete juridical persons. The Court found “no adequate
reason for holding that the sociedad en comandita ha[d] a different
138
status for purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation.”
The
Court should hold similarly for LLCs.
In Carden, the Court asserts that having established entity
139
citizenship for corporations in Letson, it has left the rest to Congress.
Assertions of deference are not justified for several reasons. First, the
claim of deference is inconsistent with the Court’s decisions. As
previously discussed, the Court mandated complete diversity in 1806
140
and granted corporations entity citizenship in 1844. It was more than
a century before Congress entered the field and legislated corporate
141
citizenship.
During that time, the Court addressed the question of
citizenship several times, both for corporations and hybrid
142
organizations.
Second, an assertion of deference implies that congressional silence
in the wake of Chapman and Great Southern can only be interpreted as

136. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
137. Id. at 481 (discussing the characteristics that make a sociedad en comandita a
juridical person).
138. Id. at 482.
139. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990).
140. See supra notes 5 and 96–97 and accompanying text.
141. Congress entered the field in 1958 with the promulgation of § 1332(c). See supra
text accompanying note 99.
142. See supra notes 50–57 and 93–98 and accompanying text.
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acquiescence to the decision to treat hybrid organizations like
143
partnerships. This is not supported.
144
Congressional silence can be interpreted in more than one way. It
might be attributable to acquiescence. On the other hand, it might also
be attributable to other factors including lack of knowledge,
indifference, inertia, pressures of more important business, political
considerations, or a tendency to trust the Court to correct its own
145
errors.
Third, there is no basis to infer that Congress intended the adoption
of § 1332(c) to preempt the judiciary with respect to determining
146
citizenship for other business organizations. The purpose of § 1332(c)
was to curtail abusive invocations of diversity by local corporations and
147
thereby reduce the number of cases eligible for diversity jurisdiction.
Congressional silence following Bouligny and Carden does not mean
148
Congress agreed with the Court’s mechanical application of § 1332(c).
Despite the Court’s attempt to indicate otherwise, Congress does not
legislate solely to curtail diversity jurisdiction. Congress created
diversity and, on several occasions, has expanded it when necessary to

143. “[T]he ‘acquiescence cases,’ in which the Court concludes that Congress’ failure to
overturn a judicial or administrative interpretation is evidence that Congress has acquiesced
in that interpretation.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67, 71 (1988).
144. “In some cases, the Court finds great meaning in ‘positive inaction.’ In other cases
the Court finds such an inquiry nothing more than ‘the pursuit of a mirage.’” Eskridge, supra
note 143, at 69 (footnote omitted); Lawrence H. Tribe, Separation of Powers and Selective
Judicial Deference, in THE SUPREME COURT TRENDS & DEVELOPMENTS 179, 184 (Dorothy
Opperman ed., 1982).
145. People v. King, 851 P.2d 27, 37 (Cal. 1993); Eskridge, supra note 143, at 71.
146. In fact, there is some basis to suggest the contrary, that Congress was just clarifying
Letson, which provided for citizenship in the state of incorporation and where it is doing
business. See supra note 97.
147. The number of diversity cases almost tripled between 1941 and 1956.
Approximately 12,700 of the 20,524 diversity actions filed in 1956 involved corporations. S.
REP. NO. 85-1830, at 11, 13–14 (1958). See Moore & Weckstein, supra note 23, at 11–12 (“In
order to relieve some of the burden of business in the federal courts and to correct asserted
abuses of diversity jurisdiction, the amendatory Act of July 25, 1958 was passed. Most
significantly, it provided that for both original and removal diversity jurisdiction, ‘a
corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of
the State where it has its principal place of business.’” (footnotes omitted)); Moore &
Weckstein, supra note 103, at 1431–32 (“The overriding purpose of the 1958 amendment was
to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. . . . One primary objective of the amendment
was to achieve a reduction in the case load of the federal courts, but Congress was also
concerned with correcting alleged abuses of diversity jurisdiction arising from the judge-made
law relating to corporate citizenship.” (footnotes omitted)).
148. See Eskridge, supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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serve the purpose of diversity jurisdiction—to provide an unbiased
149
forum for out-of-state litigants.
The amendment was designed to
eliminate a particular abuse while preserving the intent of diversity
150
When the Court applies the rule mechanically in an
jurisdiction.
attempt to limit diversity jurisdiction generally, it is not deferring to
Congress; rather the Court is establishing its own rule under the guise of
151
deference.
Fourth, deference as a basis for interpreting § 1332(c) as
intentionally excluding hybrid organizations is also unjustified. The
Court asserts that the enactment of § 1332(c) in light of the doctrinal
wall and Congress’ knowledge of the existence of at least some hybrid
organizations, indicates an intention to provide entity citizenship solely
152
for corporations.
While this is one possible conclusion, it is not the
only logical conclusion. It is equally possible that Congress focused on
curing a particular abuse and did not consider the issue of other
153
entities. The only certain inference that can be drawn from statutory
154
silence is that the legislature has not spoken.
149. Most recently Congress expanded diversity jurisdiction with the Class Action
Fairness Act. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)). Another example is the 1988 revision of § 1332 when
Congress added subsection (d), which expanded the definition of “States” to include “the
Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d) (2000). See also Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. 941, 947 (2006). For more on
Wachovia, see infra Part V.
150. If Congress had solely wanted to reduce the case load, Congress could have
codified the persons composing rule. This was the approach the Court initially applied to
corporations in Deveaux. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. As many
corporations have “diasporous investors,” this might have reduced the cases eligible for
diversity jurisdiction even more; however, it would have undercut the purpose of diversity as
it would have banned many actions in which local bias may have been a problem.
McCormack, supra note 19, at 516.
151. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 199 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
152. This is similar to “the ‘reenactment cases,’ where the acquiescence argument is
buttressed by reenactment of the interpreted statute without material change.” Eskridge,
supra note 143, at 71.
153. Limited partnership, joint stock companies may not have been expressly addressed
as they were not particularly popular entities and, therefore, not a focal point. This issue also
arose with respect to alien corporations. Did Congress intend to give dual citizenship to
corporations chartered in foreign countries? Courts originally read § 1332 strictly and said
“no.” See, e.g., Chem. Transp. Corp. v. Metro. Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563, 566–67
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (finding § 1332(c) not applicable); Eisenberg v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (finding § 1332(c) not applicable).
However, this was viewed as undercutting the purpose of § 1332(c), and in 1973 courts began
applying § 1332(c) to alien corporations. See Se. Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw,
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Since then, courts have applied § 1332(c) to
alien corporations. See Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20
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In the final analysis, the arguments supporting the assertion of
deference are inconclusive inferences drawn from congressional silence.
Deference, just like precedent, was an ill founded rationalization for
adopting an approach that the Court believed would be more likely to
protect the federal docket.
IV. ILLOGICAL AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS
Despite the lack of similarity between LLCs and limited
partnerships, the Court appears intent upon deeming Carden
155
precedential
All the same the doctrinal wall should not be extended
156
While abiding by precedent is a core aspect of our judicial
to LLCs.
system, it is not absolute. Precedent should not be blindly followed
when subsequent changes or developments of law undermine its
rationale, when it becomes difficult to apply, or when it creates
157
inconsistency with other laws.
Treating LLCs like partnerships continues the ends-oriented judicial
practice of protecting the federal docket without regard for modern
business realities or the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. Protecting an
overcrowded docket is not an end in itself, particularly when it infringes
on litigant equality. Overall, mechanically applying the persons
composing rule to LLCs solely because they are not incorporated
creates illogical and inconsistent results.
A. Diverging from Modern Business Realities
Historically, the primary business organizations were the partnership
158
Both were aggregate entities formed
and the joint stock company.

F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994); Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 774 (9th
Cir. 1992); Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985); Panalpina
Welttransport GmBh v. Geosource, Inc., 764 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1985); Vareka Invs. v.
Am. Inv. Props., 724 F.2d 907, 909 (11th Cir. 1984); Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc. 659 F.2d
31, 35 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 1332(c) applies).
154. See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 94–96 (1995).
155. As indicated above, courts have great latitude in defining which cases are similar.
See Schauer, supra note 112, at 595–97. If courts insist on maintaining a very literal, broadstroke analysis, the LLC is similar to the limited partnership because both are unincorporated
hybrid organizations.
156. If the Court finds the LLC and limited partnership similar because both are
unincorporated, Carden would still be precedential. See generally id. (discussing the virtues of
precedential constraint).
157. Id.
158. “[M]ost of the business of [the late eighteenth century was] being transacted by
unincorporated joint stock companies more in the nature of limited partnerships.”
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under the common law by contract among the parties. Corporations,
which were quite distinct from partnerships and joint stock companies,
160
did not become popular until the end of the nineteenth century.
As discussed above, it is appropriate to determine the citizenship of
161
a partnership under the persons composing rule.
The approach
accurately reflects the nature of the partnership and considers the
citizenship of the true litigants when determining whether complete
diversity is satisfied. It is also appropriate to determine the citizenship
162
The approach accurately
of a corporation under entity citizenship.
reflects the nature of the corporation and considers only the citizenship
of the true litigant, the artificial person, when determining whether
163
These rules created jurisdictional parity among
diversity is satisfied.
business organizations seeking a federal forum based on diversity
jurisdiction.
While the world of business organizations evolved from discrete
164
categories into a continuum of organizations, the rules for determining
the citizenship of these new hybrid organizations remained binary.
Courts were faced with fitting round pegs (hybrid organizations) into
square holes (aggregate or entity). As the Carden Court acknowledges,
the doctrinal wall is “technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to
policy considerations raised by the changing realities of business
165
organization.”
166
Both Chapman v. Barney and Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co.
167
v. Jones were decided during a time when both Congress and the

1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS, § 2, at 8 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999).
159. At common law, the joint stock company was considered analogous to a
partnership. See id. § 21 at 450. Over time, many states have codified the joint stock
company. These state statutes provide the joint stock company with many corporate
characteristics. Id. § 21, at 451–53.
160. Id. § 2, at 8 (“The cloud of disfavor under which corporations labored in America
was not dissipated until near the end of the eighteenth century . . . . The chief cause for the
changed popular attitude towards business corporations that marked the opening of the
nineteenth century was . . . an extension of the principle of free incorporation under general
laws.”).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 117–23.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 124–26.
163. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
165. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990).
166. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
167. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
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Court were seeking to curtail diversity jurisdiction. In both opinions,
the Court adopted a mechanical approach and refused to treat any other
organizations like corporations, even those that shared some similar
traits to a corporation. Neither opinion focuses on the issue key to the
complete diversity analysis—whether the true litigant is the organization
or its owners. Neither opinion provides guidance as to when, if ever, a
hybrid organization could qualify for entity citizenship. Steelworkers v.
169
R.H. Bouligny, Inc. is equally vague.
Further, the labor union, a
common law association, is not persuasive precedent for the LLC, a
state-created entity. Ignoring the functional realities of these hybrid
organizations and the purpose of diversity, the Court, intent on
protecting the federal docket, drew an arbitrary line. If the organization
is not incorporated, then it is not entitled to entity citizenship. It is a
simple rule, but the results are capricious.
B. The Capricious Results
1. Holes in the Screening Process
Since the adoption of check-the-box, the LLC is functionally
170
analogous to the corporation.
All the same, for purposes of
determining citizenship, courts continue to treat it like a partnership
because it is not called a corporation.
Using the citizenship of the members of the LLC does not focus the
complete diversity analysis of the true litigant. As a result, complete
diversity no longer appropriately serves its function as a screening

168. See United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S.
145, 148–49 (1965). In the post-Civil War era, Congress expanded federal jurisdiction by
granting federal question jurisdiction and removing restrictions on diversity and removal
jurisdiction. See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470; Michael G. Collins, The
Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 720–22 (1986). This
resulted in a deluge of litigation in federal court, particularly diversity actions and actions by
corporations, followed by retrenchment by Congress and the Court. See Cohen, supra note 9,
at 455; Moore & Weckstein, supra note 23, at 7–8 (“[T]he federal courts were deluged with
new business.”); Warren, supra note 94, at 672; McCormack, supra note 19, at 518–19;
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts—Suggestions for
Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 610 (1954); Patrick L. Sealey, Note, An Alternative Approach
to Diversity Jurisdiction for Corporations: Parent-Subsidiary Corporations, 20 J. CORP. L. 497,
501 (1995). Congressional limitations included increasing the amount in controversy and
limiting the right of removal to nonresident defendants. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 23,
at 8–9.
169. See 382 U.S. at 151–53.
170. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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mechanism. It does not limit the availability of diversity jurisdiction to
those situations in which the purpose of diversity is served.
For example, if all the members of an LLC are citizens of a state
other than the state of creation, under the persons composing rule the
171
LLC is not a citizen of the state of creation. This is counterintuitive.
Such an LLC could invoke diversity jurisdiction against a citizen of the
state of creation even though doing so would not promote the purpose
of diversity jurisdiction. Such an LLC could also remove to federal
court an action filed in the courts of the state of creation, despite the
172
limitation on removal by local defendants.
This concern is not merely theoretical. There are several decisions
in which this occurs. In JMTR Enterprises, LLC v. Duchin, complete
diversity existed between an LLC created under the law of Rhode
Island and a Rhode Island defendant because all members of the LLC
173
were citizens of Massachusetts.
In Hale v. MasterSoft International
Party Ltd., diversity jurisdiction existed between a Delaware LLC and
two Delaware corporations because all the members of the LLC were
174
citizens of Colorado.
Similar concerns arise if all the members of an LLC are citizens of a
state other than the state in which the LLC has its principal place of
business. Permitting an LLC to invoke diversity jurisdiction under
175
either of these circumstances undercuts the purpose of diversity.
Section 1332(c) was promulgated to prevent exactly this abuse by
176
corporations.
Although § 1332(c) does not mention LLCs; this silence should not
177
be interpreted as intending as excluding them.
Section 1332(c) was
added in 1958, almost twenty years before the LLC was created. Having
prohibited corporations from abusing diversity in this manner, it seems

171. The LLC is a legal fiction created solely by the laws of the state. It seems
incongruous to assert that it is not a citizen of that state of creation.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (“[R]emovable only if none of the parties . . . is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.”).
173. 42 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (D. Mass 1999).
174. 93 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (D. Colo. 2000).
175. See Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1981) (making the
same argument with respect to alien chartered corporations).
176. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for an example of such abuse.
177. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
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unlikely Congress intended to let hybrid entities abuse it in this manner.
178
The Court should expand its interpretation of § 1332(c) to fill this gap.
Conversely, using the persons composing rule to determine the
citizenship of an LLC precludes a neutral forum when one is needed to
promote the purpose of diversity. Consider an LLC created in
Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The
LLC has three members, all three are citizens of Pennsylvania, but
recently one changed her domicile to West Virginia. Assume also that a
third party sues the LLC in state court in West Virginia. While the LLC
179
may have good reason to fear local bias, it is unable to remove
because it is considered a citizen of West Virginia.
Further, under the persons composing rule, an LLC’s citizenship
180
changes with changes in membership.
As complete diversity is
assessed at the time of filing, an LLC may manipulate whether diversity
jurisdiction exists. For example, an LLC seeking to permanently avoid
181
federal court need only acquire a stateless member. Alternatively, an
LLC seeking to establish complete diversity could temporarily
reorganize its ownership structure to assure complete diversity. Courts
may have to expend additional time deciding whether a change in
182
membership was collusive.

178. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 199 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[A]pplication of statutes to situations not anticipated by the legislature is a pre-eminently
judicial function.” (citing David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35 (1965)).
179. See Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 787 n.11 (W. Va. 1991) (“In
any adversarial system where residents are pitted against non-residents, there will inevitably
be a temptation to redistribute wealth in the direction of residents, regardless of whether the
‘tribunal’ deciding the issue is technically a court, legislature, or administrative agency.”);
Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 906 (W.Va. 1991) (“[L]ocal juries and local
courts naturally will favor local plaintiffs over out-of-state (often faceless, publicly held)
corporations when awarding punitive damages. Inevitably, this race (whether in taxation or
damages awards) leads to increasing efforts to redistribute wealth from without the state to
within.”).
180. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Corporations lack this flexibility as to
change citizenship they must reincorporate or move their principal place of business.
181. A stateless member is a citizen of the United States domiciled outside the United
States. Courts have held that these individuals are not eligible for diversity or alienage
jurisdiction. See Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
that U.S. partners residing in foreign countries left law firm stateless for diversity jurisdiction
purposes).
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000).
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2. Turning Well-Established Rules on Their Head
As a general rule, similar parties should have similar access to
183
diversity jurisdiction. Congress has periodically adopted legislation to
184
For example, Congress
assure jurisdictional parity among litigants.
amended § 1332(a) to provide that aliens with permanent residence
have citizenship in their state of domicile. Mechanical application of the
185
The
purpose was to assure jurisdictional parity among neighbors.
doctrinal wall undermines jurisdictional parity among business
organizations.
Consider a corporation and an LLC—assume both are organized
under the law of Delaware. Both have their principal place of business
in New York and both have three owners—one is a citizen of New York,
the second is a citizen of Connecticut, and the third is a citizen of
Florida. While both the corporation and the LLC are deemed to be
legal entities under Delaware law, different rules for determining
citizenship afford them different opportunities to invoke diversity.
While the corporation has citizenship in Delaware and New York, the
LLC has citizenship in New York, Connecticut, and Florida. While the
corporation controls any change of its citizenship, the LLC does not.
Any member can change the LLC’s citizenship possibly without the
knowledge of the LLC. While neither could sue a New York citizen in
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the corporation could
invoke diversity against a Connecticut or Florida citizen but not a
Delaware citizen. The LLC, however, could invoke diversity against the
Delaware citizen but not the Florida or Connecticut citizen. There is no
186
principled reason for the difference.
Initially, determining the citizenship of alien corporations created
similar concerns about jurisdictional parity. Courts adopted a literal
183. See supra note 29.
184. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. 941, 947 (2006) (“Congress placed
national banks ‘on the same footing as the banks of the state where they were located . . . .’”
(citations omitted)). Several amendments have been designed to prevent abuse and maintain
comparable access to federal courts based on diversity jurisdiction. For example, § 1332(c)
was amended to prevent “local” corporations from invoking diversity jurisdiction by including
“principal place of business.” See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
185. The permanent resident amendment was designed to prevent a permanent resident
alien from invoking diversity jurisdiction against a neighbor. See Stephen M. Gill, Comment,
The Perfect Textualist Statute: Interpreting the Permanent Resident Alien Provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1332, 75 TUL. L. REV. 481, 487 (2000).
186. The fact that LLCs and corporations are taxed differently is not a sufficient
distinction. Subchapter S corporations are deemed to have entity citizenship despite flowthrough taxation treatment.
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reading of § 1332(c) and deemed it to apply only to corporations
187
incorporated within the United States.
Alien corporations were not
188
Two corporations with their
deemed to have dual citizenship.
principal place of business in the same state were not afforded the same
access to federal court if one was an alien corporation. If both
corporations were sued by a citizen of that state, the alien corporation
could invoke alienage jurisdiction, while the corporation incorporated in
another state could not. Recognizing that congressional silence with
respect to alien corporations probably did not mean that alien
corporations could continue to invoke a federal forum, local courts
189
revised their interpretation of § 1332(c) to apply to alien corporations.
Courts could do the same for LLCs.
It is generally accepted that citizenship for purposes of diversity
190
jurisdiction is a question of federal law.
In Great Southern, the
Supreme Court asserted that Pennsylvania could not, via state law,
deem a limited partnership association be treated like a corporation for
191
purposes of federal law. Mechanical application of the doctrinal wall
has turned this rule on its head. Courts do not examine the functional
nature of the organization; they only examine the name of the
192
organization to determine if it is incorporated under state law.
193
This approach gives states “the keys to federal jurisdiction.” Judge
Posner indicates this is acceptable because states have not taken

187. See, e.g., Chem. Transp. Corp. v. Metro. Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563, 566–67
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (finding § 1332(c) does not apply to foreign “states”); Eisenberg v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (noting that §
1332(c)’s use of a capital letter “S” in “State” refers to states within the United States). See
David A. Greher, Note, The Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to Alien Corporations: A
Dual Citizenship Analysis, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 233, 245–46 (1995).
188. Eisenberg, 189 F. Supp. at 502.
189. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d
987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994); Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir.
1992); Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985); Panalpina
Welttransport GmBh v. Geosource, Inc., 764 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1985); Vareka Invs. v.
Am. Inv. Props., 724 F.2d 907, 909 (11th Cir. 1984); Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc. 659 F.2d
31, 35 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding § 1332(c) applies to alien corporations). See Greher, supra note
187, at 245–46.
190. See Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 745–46 (7th
Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (stating that the meaning of § 1332 and taxonomy are
questions of federal law); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974).
191. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 455 (1900).
192. See Coté v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986).
193. Hoagland, 385 F.3d at 745 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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194

advantage of the possibility.
To the contrary, it raises serious
concerns. As states grow more aware of their power, they might revise
their organizational laws to take advantage of it. States could adopt
naming conventions that, regardless of the risk of local bias, seek to shift
the burden of their overcrowded dockets to federal court. Alternatively,
they might adopt naming conventions that undermine the ability to
invoke diversity jurisdiction even in circumstances where it is justified.
An examination of the application of the doctrinal wall to the
professional corporation and the LLC demonstrates how blind
adherence to this arbitrary dichotomy has created illogical and
inconsistent results. The professional corporation was created in the
1960s to allow professionals, like lawyers, doctors, and accountants to
organize in a manner that allowed them to qualify as corporations for
195
federal tax purposes. The LLC was created in the late 1970s to allow
196
businesses to merge limited liability with flow-through taxation. Both
hybrid organizations are a hodge-podge of corporate and partnership
characteristics.
LLCs tend primarily to have all the corporate
197
characteristics. Professional corporations, on the other hand, still tend
to lack the corporate characteristics of limited liability and perpetual
198
existence.
Overall, LLCs more closely resemble corporations than
professional corporations.
Despite this business reality, application of the doctrinal wall
perpetuates the opposite result. In Coté v. Wadel, the Seventh Circuit
held that despite the fact that professional corporations are much more
similar to partnerships than corporations, “a corporation is a
199
corporation is a corporation.” On the other hand, the LLC is deemed
analogous to the limited partnership and therefore its citizenship is
200
determined under the persons composing rule.

194. Id. at 743 (majority opinion).
195. In particular, professionals wanted to be able to take advantage of pension plans
and profit sharing, but these options were not available to the self-employed. See Coté, 796
F.2d at 983; Robert A. Michaels, Comment, The Professional Corporation, 13 S.D. L. REV.
368, 370 (1968).
196. See Cohen, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
197. See The Kintner Regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1995).
198. Coté, 796 F.2d at 983 (stating that professional corporation owners are accorded
some, but not total, limited liability).
199. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this approach in 2004. See Hoagland v. Sandberg,
Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). Other circuits have agreed.
See Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
200. Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998).
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This example again demonstrates how this arbitrary rule undermines
jurisdictional parity. In some states the professional corporation is
called a service corporation or a professional association. Under the
current dichotomy, the professional corporation and service corporation
are entitled to entity citizenship under the literal application of §
1332(c).
However, the professional association is not.
The
happenstance of state naming conventions should not be the basis for
determining the applicable rule of citizenship.
Additionally, it is well-established that federal jurisdiction is not
201
ousted by nominal parties.
Nominal parties are parties who have no
202
significant interest in the litigation but are joined for technical reasons.
When analyzing complete diversity, courts ignore the citizenship of
203
nominal parties.
While the members of an LLC are not technically
joined as parties, including their citizenship in the analysis of complete
diversity is the equivalent of including the citizenship of nominal parties.
3. A Purely Practical Point
On a purely practical level, jurisdictional rules should “be simple and
precise so that judges and lawyers . . . litigate . . . the merits of a legal
204
dispute [not] where and when those merits shall be litigated.”
In
theory, applying the persons composing rule to LLCs is a simple rule. In
practice, however, it is not.
When a party invokes diversity jurisdiction, the party is obligated to
205
plead diversity. However, it is unlikely that the party knows who the
members of an opposing LLC are, let alone in which states those
206
members are citizens.
This information is not a matter of public
record. Therefore, a plaintiff, or a defendant seeking removal, can only
file allegations of diversity jurisdiction based on information and belief.
201. Wood v. Davis, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 467, 469 (1855); Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 421, 451 (1823).
202. A “nominal defendant” is a person joined as defendant in an action solely because
technical rules require her joinder, not because she has any risk of liability or there is a
request for relief against her. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 946 (5th ed. 1979). Nominal
parties are named parties that lack control of, impact on, or stake in the controversy.
Nominal parties have no real interest in the suit. They are not real parties to the controversy.
Wormley, 21 U.S. (18 How.) at 451; Wood, 59 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 469.
203. Wood, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 469; Wormley, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 451.
204. In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1997).
205. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (“short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the
court’s jurisdiction depends”); 28 U.S.C § 1446(a) (2000) (“short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal”).
206. Dodge, supra note 19, at 672.
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As courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, the federal courts
207
cannot blindly accept this assertion. Discovery must ensue to confirm
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. This can be time consuming
and expensive.
While an LLC can easily ascertain the identity of its members; it
208
Citizenship is
does not necessarily know their respective citizenship.
209
an issue of personal intent and can be changed at will.
One
commentator suggests that a court could depose all the members to
ascertain their respective citizenship; however, “from an administrative
standpoint attempting such a task would be extremely inefficient,
210
expensive, and overwhelming for the courts.”
It becomes even more complicated if one of the LLC’s members is a
partnership or some other unincorporated organization. In that case the
LLC would also have to ascertain the owners of those organizations and
their respective states of citizenship. It becomes a multi-layered analysis
211
that is both time-consuming and expensive.
This is not a pragmatic
approach. Any reduction in the federal diversity caseload gained by this
approach is likely counteracted by the additional time and cost
associated with assuring the existence of diversity jurisdiction.
V. REASON FOR OPTIMISM
For over a century, in an attempt to protect the federal docket,
federal courts have maintained the doctrinal wall. Attempts, like
Russell, to apply more functional approaches have been squelched.
However, despite the result-oriented conviction of the Seventh Circuit
and some commentators, there are reasons to believe that, when

207. Federal courts have an obligation to determine if subject matter jurisdiction exists,
even if the question is not raised by the litigants. See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 681
(1889) (noting that the question of jurisdiction must be considered even if not raised by
parties); Pramco LLC v. San Juan Bay Marina, Inc., 435 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting
that subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold question for the court).
208. Citizenship of a member is not necessarily the same as that member’s residence or
business address, which is information the LLC possesses. Further, if an owner is also a
hybrid organization, the LLC likely does not know the members of the hybrid organization
(owner).
209. See supra note 7.
210. Dodge, supra note 19, at 679.
211. See Mut. Assignment & Indemnification Co. v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 364 F.3d 858,
861 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[Defendant] is a limited liability company, which means that [its
citizenship] may need to be traced through multiple levels if any of its members is itself a
partnership or LLC.”).
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presented with the question of LLC citizenship for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court might choose a different approach.
First, unlike many previous hybrid organizations, the LLC is
becoming a primary choice for business formation. In recent years, new
212
LLC filings have outpaced new corporate filings in several states. This
means the question of an LLC’s citizenship will arise with more and
more frequency. Courts will become more familiar with the LLC and
the functional similarities between it and the corporation. Additionally,
the inconsistent and illogical results arising out of application of this
arbitrary distinction between corporations and all other organizations
will become more conspicuous. Further, the logistical problems of
determining the citizenship of the members will manifest themselves
more frequently. Courts are likely to realize that gains made from fewer
suits are lost to the time and expense of ascertaining the citizenship of
the members. This understanding is likely to promote a more positive
view towards reform.
Second, the composition of the Court has changed substantially over
the past fifteen years. Only three of the Justices sitting at the time of
Carden remain. Further, the Court’s decision in Wachovia Bank v.
213
Schmidt gives reason to believe the tenor of the Court has changed
since Carden. In Wachovia Bank, the Fourth Circuit held that, for
diversity jurisdiction, a national bank was located in all states in which it
214
This holding was analogous to maintaining the
had branches.
doctrinal wall. It adopted the approach likely to result in citizenship in
more states and thereby reduce the likelihood that the national bank
could satisfy complete diversity. Not surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit
decision destroyed diversity.
215
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s decision. Unlike
Carden, the Supreme Court did not adopt the approach more likely to
curtail the availability of diversity. Rather, the Court focused on the
need to insure jurisdictional parity between national banks and their
state counterparts. Interpreting the applicable statute, the Court
recognized that the language relied upon by the Fourth Circuit had been
drafted at a time when banks were not permitted to open branches

212. See INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, supra note 36.
213. 126 S. Ct. 941 (2006).
214. 388 F.3d 414, 432 (4th Cir. 2004), overruled by Wachovia, 126 S. Ct. at 945 (holding
that, for 28 U.S.C. § 1348 purposes, a bank is a citizen of the state in which its main office, as
set forth in its articles of association, is located).
215. Wachovia Bank, 126 S. Ct. at 945.
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216

across state lines. Accordingly, it had a different meaning and should
217
not be reinterpreted out of context.
VI. A BETTER APPROACH
Courts are mechanically applying rules developed in the nineteenth
century to determine citizenship of modern business organizations. In
many respects, this scenario is reminiscent of the evolution of the rules
for personal jurisdiction. In 1877, in Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court set
218
forth rules for exercising personal jurisdiction. These were formalistic
rules based on the territorial power of the state and became known as
the Pennoyer doctrine. In the years following Pennoyer, society
changed. There was a significant growth in the number of corporations
219
and an expansion of business beyond the state of creation.
220
Additionally, there were technological advances in transportation.
However, the Pennoyer doctrine remained unchanged. Courts struggled
221
to slot situations that arose into this rigid framework.
Over time the
Court recognized that the rules no longer reflected the society in which
they had to function. Finally, in International Shoe Co. v Washington,
the Court abandoned the mechanical application of the Pennoyer
222
doctrine and adopted the more functional minimum contacts analysis.
The doctrinal wall is diversity jurisdiction’s equivalent to the
Pennoyer doctrine.
Since the Court established these rules of

216. Id. at 949.
217. Id. at 950–51.
218. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
219. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spatley, 172 U.S. 602, 619 (1899) (finding that a
growing number of corporations are doing business outside their state of incorporation);
Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753,
755 (2003) (noting one reason courts struggled to apply the seemingly simple Pennoyer
doctrine was because “the test was created for natural persons, not for fictional entities such
as corporations; in the twentieth century, America’s business was becoming the domain of
corporations.”).
220. Courts also struggled to apply the seemingly simple Pennoyer doctrine because “the
test was created at a time in American history when travel from state to state was difficult and
meaningful; in the twentieth century, interstate travel became cheap and common.”
McFarland, supra note 219.
221. For example, the Court attempted to apply these rules to corporations through the
concepts of implied consent and interpreting presence as doing business in the state. See Int’l
Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914).
222. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Formalism gave way to realism and with it mechanical
application of rules gave way to more flexible standards. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme
Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 569, 573–74 (1958).
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citizenship, there have been significant changes in the structure of
business organizations, but the rules remain unchanged.
All
unincorporated organizations should not mechanically be deemed to
have aggregate citizenship, and all incorporated organizations should
not mechanically be deemed to have entity citizenship.
While
mechanical application of the doctrinal wall may reduce the number of
suits eligible for diversity jurisdiction, it does so without regard for
modern business realities or the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. The
time has come for courts to abandon this mechanical approach.
Courts should not, however, abandon the basic concepts of
aggregate and entity citizenship. These concepts, when correctly
applied, appropriately identify the citizenship of the true litigants such
that an accurate assessment of complete diversity can be made. Rather
than applying the concepts mechanically, courts should apply them
functionally.
Members of an LLC should not be mechanically equated to
partners. The key issue in determining citizenship should not be
whether a state legislature included the word “corporation” in the
organization’s name. Instead, determining citizenship should turn on
the characteristics of the organization as they are relevant to the issues
giving rise to diversity jurisdiction. Courts should focus on the
citizenship of the true litigants—those with control of, impact on, or
personal stake in the litigation.
Clearly Congress could legislate, as it did in 1958, to correct an
abusive practice that has been allowed to develop under judicially made
223
224
law.
However, congressional action is not likely.
Therefore, the
Court needs to take action.
225
The Court should read § 1332(c) dynamically. “Corporation”
should be interpreted to include the LLC, an organization created after
the statute was adopted and sharing the entity characteristics that are

223. For a suggestion on legislation, see Cohen, supra note 9, at 473.
224. For a brief discussion on some of the difficulties in passing or amending legislation,
see Debra R. Cohen, West Virginia Corporate Law: Is it “Broke”?, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 5, 27–
30 (1997).
225. Dynamic statutory interpretation encourages statutory interpretation that adjusts
the meaning of the statutes to reflect legal, social, and cultural changes. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (1987). For
instance, courts have read § 1332(c) to cover alien corporations. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v.
Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994).
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226

relevant to a diversity analysis.
The Court has interpreted
“corporation” in the federal venue statute to include other business
227
organizations.
Alternatively, if the Court insists on perpetuating its plain meaning
reading of § 1332(c) such that it only applies to corporations, it could
apply entity citizenship to LLCs by analogy. As LLCs are analogous to
corporations as is relevant to a complete diversity analysis, an LLC’s
citizenship should be determined similarly to that of a corporation.
Overturning its prior position of aggregate citizenship, the Court created
228
entity citizenship for corporations. It can do the same for LLCs.
Under a functional approach, the LLC would have entity citizenship.
The citizenship of the members, like the citizenship of shareholders,
229
would be irrelevant.
The determination of citizenship would
consistently be decided as a matter of federal law based on the business
realities. Under this approach, LLCs would have access to federal
courts comparable to their corporate counterparts. Further, this
approach would eliminate many potentially abusive invocations of
diversity jurisdiction as complete diversity would only be available when
needed to provide a neutral forum.
This approach is still simple in theory. Additionally, it is simpler in
practice. Logistically it is easier to determine the state of organization
and principal place of business than the citizenship of each member of
an LLC. It also reduces the likelihood of manufactured diversity. The
approach also more accurately reflects the realities of modern business
organizations and more consistently promotes the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction.
A new functional approach will not resolve concerns about an
overcrowded docket. Unfortunately there are no simple solutions for
this problem. However, the Court should address this concern directly
in a manner that does not undercut the purpose of the procedural and
226. See supra text accompanying notes 177–78. This would be analogous to
reinterpreting § 1332(c) to apply to alien corporations. See supra text accompanying notes
187–188.
227. See Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S.
556, 565 (1967) (“[T]here are sound policies for treating unincorporated associations like
corporations and . . . Congress implicitly intended for the expanded concept of corporate
residence under [the venue statute] to be applied in determining the residence of an
unincorporated association.”).
228. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
229. If litigants wanted to seek recovery against a member, that member in his or her
individual capacity could be joined as a party, in which case his or her citizenship would be
relevant to the complete diversity analysis.
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substantive rules it was created to enforce. One possibility is that the
Court could re-examine the definition of citizenship and, if appropriate,
expand the definition to reflect changes in modern society.
Definitions established over a century ago are no longer appropriate.
It may be that citizenship should be more broadly defined. For
individuals, this might include expanding citizenship from the one state
of domicile to all states of residence. For entities, it might include
expanding the definition of principal place of business to include more
than one state.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the rhetoric and bandwagon of support, aggregate
citizenship for LLCs does not work. Applying the persons composing
rule to LLCs as a roundabout way to protect the federal docket raises
serious problems without any assurances that it actually provides any
protection. While concern about the federal docket is understandable,
federal courts should look to other mechanisms for protecting the
federal docket.
Law must evolve to reflect the changes in society. Rules of
jurisdiction are no different. Just as the mechanical application of the
Pennoyer doctrine gave way to the more functional approach of
minimum contacts, it is time for the arbitrary rule for determining
citizenship of business organizations to change. Business organizations
no longer fit neatly into the discrete compartments of corporations or
partnerships. New rules need to be developed that reflect the modern
business realities and perpetuate the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.
These rules should also respect jurisdictional parity and other
fundamental rules of jurisdiction.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967435

